国企发展的七大趋势：西方国企的兴衰完结篇
国企发展的七大趋势：西方国企的兴衰完结篇此外，各国的文化、发展水平也影响绩效。文化可能会影响管理人员的经营自主权。不同的文化背景下，人们利用政治指示将企业的资金转移到某些利益集团的方式也不同。Further differences in culture in different countries may affect performance. So does the country's level of development. Culture may have an impact on the autonomy of managers and on the use of political directives to siphon funds from the enterprise to certain interest groups.人们对所有制有许多偏见。经济学家在预测经济表现的时候，会考虑市场结构(竞争环境)、监管环
作者：吴刚梁
导语：在西方，各国国企的财务状况大都不如私企。尽管不少人仍在意识形态上偏爱国企，或者看重国企履行社会职能，但沉重财政负担让不少国家最终被迫选择了私有化。私有化之后，很多企业的绩效得到了明显提高，难道私有化真的是灵丹妙药吗？还是说，它们业绩的改善并不仅仅是因为所有制的变化，背后有着更重要的原因？今天，老吴带您一起读原著。别忘了最后还有老吴的“精彩”点评哦。
决定企业绩效的因素
There are many stereotypes of the impact of ownership. Economists see structure (competitive environment) and the regulatory environment as well as ownership as predictors of performance (high competition entails better performance).
人们对所有制有许多偏见。经济学家在预测经济表现的时候，会考虑市场结构(竞争环境)、监管环境以及所有制等因素。一般来说，竞争程度越高，市场效率就越高。
For organizational scientists performance is a function of the context (environment size technology) the effectiveness of management's strategic response and the appropriateness of the organization's structure and systems to both context and strategic actions.
对组织学家来说，绩效取于特定条件(环境、规模、技术)和管理战略，以及组织结构对特定条件和战略行动是否相适应。
Further differences in culture in different countries may affect performance. So does the country's level of development. Culture may have an impact on the autonomy of managers and on the use of political directives to siphon funds from the enterprise to certain interest groups.
此外，各国的文化、发展水平也影响绩效。文化可能会影响管理人员的经营自主权。不同的文化背景下，人们利用政治指示将企业的资金转移到某些利益集团的方式也不同。
In its recent publications the World Bank has argued that private enterprise is more efficient than SOEs even when it exercises a strong monopoly power and that reform would allow "increased availability of resources for health education and other social spending" (World Bank 1995 35 23 257).
世界银行指出，即使私企搞垄断，其效率也要比国企高，因此，各国应该开放“卫生、教育和其他社会资源”（World Bank 1995 35 23 257)。
The World Bank even claimed that private enterprise achieves social goals such as pollution abatement more efficiently "since state-owned plants tend to be more polluting than their private sector counterparts" (World Bank 1995 38).
世界银行还称，私企在减少污染、实现社会目标等方面，效率也更高，“因为国企工厂的污染往往比同行业的私企更严重”(World Bank 1995 38)。
Economists at the World Bank trumpet the virtues of private enterprise as the major vehicle for economic development. In doing so they may confuse ownership and other variables such as competition culture and political milieu that may better explain performance.
世界银行的经济学家提出，各国应将私企作为经济发展的主要工具，并大谈这样做的好处。但他们把所有制和其他因素混淆起来，这些因素包括竞争、文化和政治环境，等等。
Thus the quality and style of top management are crucial determinants of performance. Irrespective of ownership organizations operating in the same environment may show great differences in performance due to differences in managerial quality style strategies systems or structures.
管理层的能力和风格是决定绩效的关键因素。在相同环境中运行的企业，由于各自的管理能力、风格、策略、或结构的不同，绩效水平也相差很大，不论它们是何种所有制。
Moreover when a private enterprise operates in a noncompetitive environment or when the institutional environment does not guarantee property rights or when a private firm is heavily subsidized in return for its commitment to achieve employment goals ownership per se would not make the firm a superior performer.
此外，如果企业的经营环境是非竞争性，或者法律制度不保护财产权利，或者因实现就业目标等就能得到政府的大额补贴，那么，即使是私有企业，其业绩也不出色。
国企天生有缺陷？
There are two major theoretical reasons for assuming that ownership is a direct determinant of performance.
有两种理论认为所有制直接决定了企业的业绩。
One is the idea espoused by the property rights school of thought: patterns of incentives at any time are influenced by the property rights structure. Individual owners enjoy the right to change the form place substance or use of any property they own subject only to minimal government restrictions such as zoning laws.
一是产权学派的观点，他们认为，在任何时候，激励方式是由产权性质决定的。个人业主有权随时变更自己财产的形式、地点、内容或用途，受到的政府限制最少，只有城市规划方面的法律。
In an SOE it is virtually impossible to transfer the ownership rights belonging to the state from one individual or group to another. Taxpayers who wish to change their investment portfolios cannot sell their shares in an SOE.
而在国企，所有权属于国家，几乎不可能从某个个人或集团转移到另一个个人或集团。作为国企的终极所有者，纳税人对自己的国有资产状况不满意时，不能出售他们在国企中的份额。
In theory at least they can change citizenship and move to another country in which the portfolio of assets held by the state is more to their liking. Taxpayers can of course vote in elections thereby attempting to change the preferences of the state and its policies.
不过理论上，他们可以改变国籍，移民到另一个国有资产状况更令自己满意的国家。纳税人还可以在选举中投票，选择自己喜欢的执政者，从而试图改变国企的相关政策。
They do not however have an easy or direct way to transfer their share of the property rights in any SOE. The inability to transfer ownership rights is said to result in state ownership being inherently less efficient than private ownership.
但无论如何，它们不能简单地或直接地转让它们的国有资产份额。据说，由于国有企业的份额难以转让，导致国企的效率天生就不如私企。
Owners of private firms have an incentive to monitor management's behavior to ensure efficiency. By contrast a taxpayer owner of an SOE being part of a diffused ownership does not have a similar incentive to scrutinize management.
私企的所有者有动力去监督管理层，以确保高效率。相比之下，国企的所有者（纳税人）由于过于分散，没有像私企老板那样的动机来监督管理层。
The greater the personal financial investment the greater the interest in the operations of the firm. Owner-managers have the highest stake and therefore care more.
一般来说，个人对企业投入的资金越多，就越关心公司的经营。如果股东兼任总经理，那么，他个人的利益与公司利益联系最为紧密，因此会更关心企业。
If ownership is diffused and separated from management the additional monitoring costs may make the firm less efficient. Owners can still motivate managers however by linking their compensation to the firm's profits allowing managers to capture part of any monetary gains through stock options for example.
如果股权分散，且所有权与管理权相分离，那么，监督成本会提高，公司的效率会降低。然而，所有者可以做事情是，将管理层的薪酬与公司的利润挂钩，以激励经理人，例如通过股票期权的方式，让经理层获取部分现金收益。
In an SOE neither the manager nor the government bureaucrat has personal wealth invested in the firm and they have no right to share in profits. The lack of a connection between the firm's economic performance and the manager's personal pecuniary gains it is claimed reduces efficiency.
在国企，管理者和政府官员都没有拿自己的钱投资于企业，且他们无权分享国企的利润。有人说，由于国企的业绩与管理人员个人的收入之间没有关系，这会降低国企效率。
Further transferability of shares encourages specialization of ownership. According to Armen Alchian (1965 1977) the fact that a private firm's shareholders can sell their shares in the capital market means that shareholders are the ones who find their highest valued use as an input.
此外，股份的可转让性促使股份专属化。Armen Alchian（1965 1977）认为，私企股东可以在资本市场上出售他们的股票，这意味着股份最终会落入到那些能使自己的投资价值最大化的人手中。
Others simply exercise their exit right and sell the shares. Ownership Peltzman (1971) argues can be viewed as a productive input that organizes managerial inputs and fulfills the functions of risk bearing.
一般投资者则只是行使他们的退出权并抛出股票。Peltzman(1971)认为，股权可以被看作是一种生产投入，它同时把职业经理人的管理技能投入组织起来，并承担相应的风险。
If a market for these rights is not available as in the case of an SOE the distribution of taxpayer-owners or even of government bureaucrats acting as their agents will not reflect their highest valued use as an input at least not as frequently as in an investor-owned private enterprise.
但是，国企股权没有这样一个可交易的市场，终极所有者及其代理人（官员）的分布状况（过于分散），因此不能像私企那样体现投入价值的最大化。
关于所有制
The studies surveyed here do not seem to corroborate the property rights point of view. The stereotype that managers of SOEs are less capable than their counterparts in the private sector and therefore that SOEs are destined to perform poorly is not necessarily true (Aharoni and Lachman 1982).
然而，我们这里的调查研究似乎没有证实产权学派的观点。传统认为国企管理者不如私企管理者能力强，国企的业绩注定不好，不一定正确。（Aharoni Lachman 1982）。
Unfortunately there are very few studies of the inner workings of SOEs and their reaction to the environment in which they operate. However the survey of performance here shows that if both private firms and SOEs operate in a competitive environment and abide by the same rules and the same set of incentives SOEs are not necessarily less efficient.
不幸的是，关于国企内部的运作方式及如何应对经营环境，这方面的研究很少。然而，我们的绩效研究显示，如果私企和国企都在竞争性的环境中经营，遵守相同的法规，有着类似的激励措施，那么，国企业效率不一定比私企低。
Competitive market pressures may be sufficient to yield productive efficiency even when shares are nontransferable. Competition can be stimulated by institutional means too. On the other hand a large private enterprise may be led to assume that the government would not allow it to go bankrupt.
即使国企的份额不可转让，市场竞争的压力也足以使国企提高生产效率。竞争也可以通过制度手段来刺激。另一方面，大型私企也会倾向于相信政府不敢让它破产。
These arguments clearly show that SOEs and private firms are not competing on the same playing field and thus their performance cannot be strictly compared.
我们的论文还清楚地表明，国企和私企不在同一个赛道上竞争，因此严格来说，它们的业绩没有太大的可比性。
The other possible reason to prefer private ownership is that politicians and bureaucrats find it difficult to refrain from intervening in the operations of SOEs but behave differently when private investors control the firm.
人们偏好私有化的另一个原因是，要让政客和官员们不干预国企的经营是很难的，但如果企业由私人投资者控股，就不一样了。
Studies of privatized telecommunications firms in Latin America clearly document striking gains in productivity and a rapid expansion of the telephone network. In the first three or four years after privatization the network grew by 13 percent per year in Argentina and Mexico 15 percent in Venezuela and 18 percent in Jamaica.
对拉丁美洲电信私有化的研究表明，电信企业在私有化之后生产率显著提高，电话网络覆盖率也快速扩张。在私有化后的头三四年，阿根廷和墨西哥的覆盖率每年增长13%，委内瑞拉增长15%，牙买加增长18%。
Labor productivity measured by lines in service per employee also increased dramatically - from 13 percent per year in Mexico to 19 percent in Argentina. These enviable achievements came about because capital investment increased and the work force was trimmed (Ramamurti 1996).
劳动生产率（每位员工服务的线路数）也大幅提高，其中，墨西哥提高13%，阿根廷19%。不过，这些成果是由于资本投资增加和裁员导致的（Ramamurti 1996）。
These changes can be ascribed to privatization but they could not have been achieved except by a major shift in government policy and regulations. These changes allowed a sharp increase in prices prior to privatization.
这些变化可以归因于私有化，但如果政府的政策与规章不发生相应的变化，即使私有化，也无法取得这些成果。在私有化之前，政府允许它们大幅提价。
Clearly the firms were not allowed to invest the funds needed to expand their services before privatization. Freed from these constraints the firms were guided by a more focused pursuit of profits and were managed by a clear line of command.
显然，这些公司如果不搞私有化，是不会得到资金以扩大其服务规模的。私有化之后，各种限制被解除，这些公司更专注于追求利润，管理上的指挥与命令线也更清晰。
In the real world therefore privatization triggered other changes. Large-scale privatization yielded large sums of cash to the government particularly when large state monopolies were sold. Telmex alone raised four times as much money for the Mexican government as the 723 firms that had been privatized previously (Ramamurti 1996 24).
现实中，私有化实际上引起了其他方面的变化。大规模私有化为政府带来了大量现金流，特别是出售大型国有垄断企业。在墨西哥，仅出售Telmex一家公司，政府获得的资金就相当于此前出售723家公司资金的4倍（Ramamurti 1996 24）。
In return for their investment private investors received changes in the regulatory regime that allowed them to pursue profit and efficiency. These changes however were also allowed when ownership remained in the hands of the government and the firm was managed under contract.
作为对私人投资者的回报，政府会改变相关的监管政策，以使私人投资者能够追求利润和提高效率。值得注意的是，如果不改变国有产权，而是实行契约化管理，政府其实也可能改变监管政策。
In some countries buyers of privatized firms were required to guarantee that workers would not be laid off or paid less in the future (Leeds 1989). In other countries private enterprise encountered a furious chorus of invectives against avarice and cupidity and government tended to control business through an antagonistic system of regulations.
在有些国家，私人投资者必须保证私有化之后不裁员或不降薪（Leeds 1989）。在另一些国家，私企因贪婪遭到了猛烈的抨击，于是政府倾向于出台一些反制性的措施来控制企业。
When private investors faced a multitude of restrictions of this sort performance was less than great. Thus these efficiency differentials are as much the result of market structure government policies and institutional controls as of ownership type.
当私人投资者面临此类限制措施时，它们的业绩并不是很好。因此，这表明私有化带来的效率提升，既与所有制有关，也与市场结构、政府政策和制度管控相关。
Labor productivity in airlines seems to be related to industrial policies more than to ownership (Ramamurti and Sarathy 1997). SOEs operating in a competitive environment and not impeded by government-imposed constraints may be as efficient as privately owned firms similarly situated.
对于航空公司来说，其劳动生产率似乎更多地取决于产业政策，而不是所有制性质 （Ramamurti and Sarathy 1997)。同等条件下的国企，如果能够在竞争的环境中经营，且不受政府施加的限制的影响，可能与私企一样有效率。
If the government severely restricts a private enterprise's freedom of action it too becomes inefficient and unprofitable. To be sure private investors facing such restrictions may simply exit. The unanswered question is: Can government create a regime allowing SOEs the same operational rules as those of private enterprise?
从另一方面说，如果政府严重限制私企的自主经营权，它们同样也会变得低效和不盈利。当然，如果私企面临此类限制措施，私人投资者可能会干脆退出市场。问题是：政府能否建立一个机制，允许国企拥有和私企同等的经营规则?
决定业绩的四大因素
The determinants of performance therefore are not rooted in ownership. They may be found in the relationship between country characteristics government policies and firm strategies (De Castro and Uhlenbruck 1997; Lenway and Murtha 1994).
因此，决定业绩的根本因素并不是所有制，它还与国家的特性、政府政策和企业战略以及它们之间的相互作用有关（De Castro and Uhlenbruck 1997; Lenway and Murtha 1994）。
More precisely there are four interrelated sets of determinants: (1) objective factors such as level of available infrastructure or market structure; (2) the way managers are recruited; (3) decisions made outside the enterprise concerning rules about investment pricing labor policies or funding; and (4) the internal organization of the firm.
准确地说，有四组相互关联的决定因素：（1）客观条件，如现有的基础设施水平或市场结构；（2）管理人员的招聘方式；（3）决策程序，企业外部做出的有关投资、定价、劳工政策、资金等方面的决定；（4）公司的内部组织结构。
The first determinant of performance does not need to be elaborated here. Clearly the performance of any firm depends on the availability of a certain infrastructure and on the existence of institutions for example those protecting property rights.
第一个决定因素在此毋须多言。显然，任何企业要想取得业绩，都得依赖于基础设施和法律制度，例如那些保护财产权的制度。
Thus Iheduru (1994) argues that the privatization of maritime SOEs in West Africa is unlikely to result in increased efficiency because of structural constraints in the world maritime industry and domestic policy contexts.
因此，Iheduru(1994)认为，即使西非搞海事领域的国企私有化，也不太可能带来效率的提升，因为这还受到世界航运业的竞争结构以及国内政策环境的限制。
Major determinants of performance are the way managers are recruited and the incentive structure they face.
管理人员的招聘方式及激励制度是决定公司业绩的重要因素。
If managers are recruited for political reasons and abide by political rules rather than by market discipline or if government ownership of the enterprise means that the managers of the enterprise are accountable to ruling political parties rather than to the dictates of the marketplace then performance will be harmed.
如果国企的管理人员任职是因为政治上的因素，则他们遵守的政治规则而不是市场规律，或者说国企管理人员只对执政党负责，而不是对市场负责，那么国企的业绩将受到损害。
If the external controllers impose managers who are not necessarily the most competent or if management suffers from cynicism resentment low morale or apathy as a result of external influence then performance will deteriorate.
如果经理层能力一般，而且受到外部实际控制人的压力（政府主管人员），从而变得悲观、怨恨、士气低落或缺乏热情，则业绩会更加恶化。
Resource allocation decisions are influenced by the structure of tasks and authority and by the reward and punishment structure. Performance in the sense of efficiency depends on the design of the state system including the rules of interaction within the internal and external coalitions and between them.
资源配置的决策，会受到任务性质、权力结构和奖惩制度的影响。作为效率衡量标准的绩效，也取决于国家的体制，包括内部与外部各种势力的分化组合。
It also depends on the credibility of different regulations. Thus if managers believe that the SOE (or private firm) cannot go bankrupt they might take more risks.
绩效还取决于监管的信誉。因此，如果管理层相信政府不会让国企（甚至某些私企）破产，那么，他们愿意冒更大的风险。
Different rules of the game may reform SOEs and make them more efficient. Because efficiency depends on the rules of interaction of both the internal and external parts of the organization a change of ownership will change performance only if these rules are changed as well.
不同的游戏规则可能会促使国企改革，提高它们的效率。因为效率取决于组织内部和外部的相互作用，因此，只有当内外规则也发生相应变化，所有制的变更才能产生绩效。
Experience shows that governments tend to use SOEs to achieve external objectives when the additional costs can be hidden from the public. One dubious advantage of subsidies through the price mechanism of an SOE is that the subsidies are not transparent.
经验表明，政府往往会利用国企来实现其外部目标，这种方式可以向社会隐藏额外的成本。通过国企的价格机制实施补贴是一种优势，因为这种补贴不透明。
If government controllers behave as if the SOE were an autonomous entity comparable to a private firm and use the same set of rewards and punishments the performance of the enterprise will be enhanced.
如果政府监管人员把国企当作与私企类似的自主经营实体，并采用相同的奖惩机制，那么，国业的绩效将得到提高。
The internal organization of the firm is related to the degree of autonomy enjoyed by management. What I have elsewhere called "an agent without a principal" causes many performance problems (Aharoni 1982 89).
公司的内部组织方式决定了管理层享有多少自主权。我在其他地方所说过，“没有委托人的代理人”会导致许多问题(Aharoni 1982 89)。
In many cases privatization has triggered other changes including a major increase in the level of management autonomy the creation of a clear line of command and a more focused pursuit of narrowly defined goals.
在许多案例中，私有化引发了其他变化，包括增加了自主经营权，命令线更清晰，精力更集中，目标更明确。
Several things seem clear. First poor monitoring excessive intervention and attempts by civil servants to minimize managerial discretion lead to risk aversion lack of initiative and waste.
有几个问题是确定的。首先，监管不力、过度干预以及政府主管人员总是想把管理层的自由裁量权降至最低，这些因素会导致管理层逃避风险与责任，缺乏主动性和浪费资源。
Second the persistent tendency of government to use SOEs as conduits for dispensing subsidies or political patronage has been a major cause of losses and inefficiency.
其次，政府将国企当作发放补贴或提供政治恩惠的渠道，是造成亏损和效率低下的主要原因。
Third a new managerial class has evolved in some countries which is attempting to acquire more autonomy for independent action. Finally in some cases private entrepreneurs have found it more profitable to extract commitments subsidies and other largess from government than to manage the business in the marketplace.
再次，一个新的职业经理人队伍已经在一些国家形成，他们希望拥有更多的独立自主的经营权。在某些情况下，企业家发现从政府那里获得承诺、补贴和其他好处，要比在市场化的企业那里容易得多。
It is important to remember that in judging performance one is engaged in comparing statistics rather than comparing an actual situation to some ideal.
别忘了，人们在判断绩效时，是比较统计数据，而不是将实际情况与理想状态进行比较。
Finally the major determinant of performance is the institutional system within which managers operate. This in turn has an impact on managerial incentives and on the structure of the economic system.
最后，绩效的重要决定因素是管理人员所处的制度体系。它反过来又对管理激励和经济制度产生影响。
Several studies have shown that when the government allows greater autonomy either through privatization or through management contracts performance is enhanced. The problem therefore is to install mechanisms allowing higher performance not simply to change ownership.
若干研究表明，当政府通过私有化或契约方式给予管理层更多的自主权，业绩就会得到提高。因此，问题的关键是要建立有利于提高绩效的机制，而不是简单地改变所有制。
It may be that in a particular society there is a built-in conflict between growth imperatives and distributive pressures.
在某些国家和地区，经济增长与分配方式之间存在一种内在的冲突。
When the latter win and when distributive conflicts impinge on government behavior the pressures on SOEs become high and they are destined to perform poorly. SOE managers do not have enough incentives to run efficient operations and their operational monitoring systems suffer from the same weaknesses.
当分配方式上的压力占上风、并冲击到政府的行为时，国企的压力就会变得很大，注定会表现得很差（指国企需要向社会其他主体提供价格补贴）。国企的管理层没有足够的动力去好好经营国企，负责监管国企的官员同样也没有这个动力。
A one-time adjustment when a country faces an economic crisis as happened in Mexico when its national debt escalated may allow the government to carry out a reform. Such a reform "must be politically desirable . . . [and] politically feasible and the government must be able to promise credibly to stick to the reform in the future" (World Bank 1995 233).
当一个国家面临经济危机时，比如墨西哥的发生债务危机，这种一次性的大调整会促使政府进行改革。这种改革“在政治上是可取的……而且在政治上是可行的，政府必须能够令人信服地承诺在未来坚持改革”（World Bank 1995 233)。
结论
Since the end of World War II SOEs have become ever more important in both developed and developing countries. In the last decade or two it has been gradually noticed that SOEs perform much worse than large multinational firms in the private sector. Further governments have found it increasingly difficult to carry the deficit burden of SOEs.
自二战结束以来，国企在发达国家和发展中国家都变得越来越重要。在过去的一二十年里，人们注意到国企的表现比私营的大型跨国公司差得多。此外，政府面临越来越大的国企亏损负担。
Both the World Bank and the IMF have taken steps to cajole governments into reducing trade barriers and increasing the role of the private sector.
世界银行和国际货币基金组织都已采取措施，劝说各国政府减少贸易壁垒，提高私营部门的作用。
Around the world governments have been attempting to privatize SOEs because of the generally held beliefs that their performance has been disappointing that the results of previous efforts to reform them have been temporary or unsuccessful and that privatization is necessary to reduce poverty foster efficiency and free public resources for social programs and for the creation of infrastructure.
在世界各地 政府一直努力对国企进行私有化，因为各国普遍认为国企的业绩令人失望，此前的种种改革措施都没有效果，而私有化才是减少贫困，促进效率，将公共资源用于基础设施和社会事业的途径。
Privatization was also initiated to reduce the burden on hard-pressed public budgets. This burden was partly the result of SOEs' heavy losses and could be alleviated through the proceeds of sales.
私有化也是缓解公共预算压力的办法。这种财政负担在一定程度上是国企巨亏的结果，政府可以通过出售国企来获得收入，减少亏空。
Despite the debate and the pressures very little has changed. The World Bank (1995 25) noted that "the SOE sector has remained stubbornly large." The share of SOEs in GDP has remained at around 11 percent - about the same as two decades ago.
尽管各国都存在各种争议和要求私有化的压力，但国企的状况几乎没有改变。世界银行（1995，25）指出，“国有部门依旧保持着庞大的规模。”国企在GDP中所占的比例一直保持在11%左右，与20年前大致相同。
In the least developed countries the share is even higher (around 14 percent). Governments continue to use SOEs for all sorts of political purposes and to placate all sorts of interest groups. Therefore the means by which improved performance can be achieved are of crucial importance.
在欠发达国家，这一比例甚至更高（约14%）。政府继续将国企用于各种政治目标，安抚各种利益集团。在这种情况下，如何提高国企的绩效显得尤为重要。
We have analyzed the performance of SOEs and found it to have been dismal under some definitions of performance. We have also compared the performance of SOEs and private firms. Finally based on this analysis we have discussed the more important questions of the determinants of performance and the political rules allowing for change.
我们对国企的绩效进行了分析。根据现有的绩效标准，国企表现令人沮丧。我们还将国企和私企的业绩进行了比较。最后，在此基础上，我们讨论了更重要的问题，即绩效的决定因素和国企改革的政治条件。
All in all the performance of any enterprise depends on the incentives managers face the structure of competition and the environment within which managers operate. The history of the last two decades shows that all of these variables changed simultaneously with the advent of privatization.
总之，任何企业的绩效都取决于管理层的激励方式、竞争结构以及管理层所处的环境。过去二十年的历史表明，随着私有化，上述因素也都相应地发生了变化。
A major theoretical question is the degree to which these changes would have been possible without the change of ownership. It is also essential to choose performance measures carefully. In many cases performance is equated with profitability.
一个重要的理论问题是，如果没有所有制的改变，这些变化在多大程度上也可以实现。此外，仔细选择绩效指标也很重要，在许多情况下，人们仅以盈利能力作为绩效指标。
老吴点评
本节内容是《西方国企的兴衰》的第三部分的最后一节。至此，老吴以逐句对照翻译、网络连载的方式，完成了该书的30%。考虑到原著的版权问题，今后不再进行连载。对国企改革话题有兴趣的朋友，可以持续关注老吴的著作、译著、课程和相关文章。
本节提到了影响国企绩效的一个根源性问题：所有者缺位。国企的终极所者是全体纳税人，国企的管理者以及各级国资监管人员实际上成了“没有委托人的代理人”，因此缺乏所有权激励效应，他们不可能像私营企业的股东那样关心自己的企业发展。这个问题也是长期困扰我国国企改革的核心问题之一。
不过，本书的作者认为，所有权只是表面问题，最重要的是营商环境。他甚至认为，如果政府能在其他方面进行改革，例如，建立具有竞争性的市场经济体制，增强对管理层的激励与约束，减少国企的政策性任务，防止政府人员干预国企的自主经营，那么，国企就没有必要进行私有化，国企同样能取得好的经营业绩。然而，原作者一直没有回答的问题是：如果不触及国企的产权，这些改革措施能到位吗？
当前，我国推出了一系列新的国企改革措施，包括董事会建设，职业经理人市场化招聘和任职契约化，剥离“三供一业”，以“市场中性原则”对待各种所有制的企业，等等。不难看出，在很大程度上，这些改革措施的思路与原作者不谋而合。不同的是，我们虽然反对大规模的私有化，但仍然强调产权改革的重要性，只不过选择了渐进式的产权改革模式：混合所有制改革。
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